



## Jean Monnet Research Network on EU–UN Relations (EUN-NET)

# The EU at the UN Security Council: Institutional Representation and Political Presence

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
Lifelong  
Learning  
Programme

# EU-IOs Interactions


- Interactions have both an internal and an external dimension
  - internal dimension: intra-EU institutional and political implications of the interaction (intra-EU policymaking coordination and institutional representation);
  - external dimension: effect of the EU's presence on the functioning of the respective IOs (effect on their institutional format and policymaking process and outputs).
- One significant caveat:
  - the 'EU international action' not limited to the EU collective actions alone but incorporate the actions of individual member-states with an effect on the EU dimension (antagonistic or symbiotic relationship?)

# EU-UN Relations at a Glance


**% of membership - UN**



**% of UN budget contributions**



**% of peacekeeping budget contributions**



**% of peacekeepers**



# The EU at the UNSC : Any Impact at All?



# EU in the UNSC

- The UNSC is the most important political organ of the UN, entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security
- Objectives:
  - Identify the EU institutional representation and political presence in the UNSC
  - Assess the EU' engagement at the ongoing debate on the UNSC reform

# The EU in UNSC: Institutional Representation (1/3)

- ‘institutional representation’: EU member-states occupying a permanent or non-permanent UNSC seat
- two permanent members (UK and France)
- EU member-states appear in three different regional groups
  - Western European and Others Group – WEOG
  - Eastern European Group -EES
  - Cyprus in the Asian Group
- **rotating Presidency** : usually statements of a declaratory and symbolic nature and occurred rather rarely (usually less than forty per year).
- **High Representative**: opportunity to address the UNSC, but all UNSC members had to agree upon inviting the HR

# The EU in UNSC: Institutional Representation (2/3)

- Post-Lisbon, “... when the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the High Representative be invited to present the Union’s position” (A. 34, para. 2.iii).
- HR becomes more actively engaged in the UNSC functioning.
- Individual EU member-states + institutional potential for a collective EU presence in the UNSC

# The EU in UNSC: Institutional Representation (3/3)

- **In contrast to the UNGA, coordination in the UNSC is problematic**
- The EU member-states that serve in the UNSC and especially the two permanent members have been urged repeatedly to improve such coordination
- **Sporadic attempts** (Spain, Germany in 2002 and Italy in 2007) to enhance information exchange
- “[M]ember States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States and the High Representative fully informed. **Member States which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.**” (Article 34, para 2.ii).



	Σύνολο Συνεδριάσεων UNSC	Παρεμβάσεις ΕΕ (σύνολο)	EU Del	EEAS	EU Special Representatives	HR	President of the European Council
<b>2009</b>							
<b>2010</b>							
<b>2011</b>	235	32	31	0	0	1	0
<b>2012</b>	199	30	28	2	0	0	0
<b>2013</b>	193	31	26	1	3	1	0
<b>2014</b>	263	32	26	4	0	1	1
<b>2015</b>	328	24	19	2	0	3	0
<b>2016</b>	256	35	32	1	0	2	0
<b>2017</b>	296	29	24	0	0	5	0
<b>2018</b>	288	31	30	1	0	0	0

# The EU in UNSC: Political Presence

- Three ways of engagement:
  - EU member-states **sponsor** (individually or collectively) many UNSC **draft resolutions** (non-proliferation, terrorism, prevention of regional conflicts, crises management, human security issues).
  - **Implementation of UNSC resolutions**: imposition of sanctions and orchestration of peacekeeping operations.
  - **Financial contributions** in the regular UN budget but also commitment of substantial personnel and financial resources, (in aggregate approximately 40% expenses of UNSC-authorized peacekeeping operations and about 8% of the troops and other personnel involved in these operations)

# The EU and the UNSC Reform Debate (1/3)

- The *de jure* reform has evolved in three stages:
  - around the 'quick-fix formula' (1992-5);
  - around the 'two plus three formula' (Razali Plan, 1997);
  - following the 2004 Report of the *High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* after the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration;
  - since the 2004 Report, UN members have regrouped forming three major blocs: first, the Group of Four (G4 - Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil), supported by the UK and France; second, 53 states of the African Union; and third, the 'Uniting for Consensus' (UfC) group, with the participation among other countries of Italy, Malta, and Spain; the G4 used the backing of most EU member-states as leverage to the African countries to overcome their reactions.

# The EU and the UNSC Reform Debate (2/3)

- the **intra-EU cleavages** and battle lines have remained **quite constant**
- UK and France to escape unscathed; Germany pursues permanent post; Italy and to a lesser extent Spain the most prominent and consistent critics, have sponsored instead 'an embryonic EU seat';
- Although the often rhetoric invocation of the 'European interest', both *status quo* proponents and reform *demandeurs* engage in the UNSC reform debate in pursuit of particularistic, national interests;
- Another EU cluster comprises '**middle powers**' and '**EU neutrals**' like the Netherlands, Ireland, Austria, and the Nordic trio -Sweden, Finland, Denmark: support membership expansion but diverging considerably on the issue of veto extension.
- CEECs: embraced the Razali Plan, in 1997, to ensure one additional non-permanent seat to their regional grouping

# The EU and the UNSC Reform Debate

## (3/3)

- Monolithic focus on a **single EU seat** or an additional seat for an EU member-state: **unrealistic (?)**
- more attention on the increasingly **effective coordination mechanisms** and Lisbon Treaty provisions (HR and EEAS);
- emphasis on coordination and information sharing reveals that EU member-states understand the need for common standing
- key EU members shifted emphasis towards an intermediate solution
  - France and the UK (in their joint contribution): a new category of seats with a longer mandate than that of the currently elected non-permanent UNSC members (Italian proposal);
  - Germany insists on expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members (considers all other variations just disguised forms of an enlargement in the non-permanent category only).

# Conclusions

- UNSC more difficult arena for the EU to engage *collectively* in world affairs (than UNGA)
- Lisbon Treaty provides more institutional coordination potential, still not fully explored (half-empty glass)
- But significant progress is under way (half-full glass)

